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The Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) epidemic, due to unique
transmission, fatal course, psychosocial implication, and discrimination from social
opprobrium, has provided legislative stimulus for policy designed to achieve
balance among public health concerns of preventing, treating, and monitoring the
disease, and private, decision-making interests.' Statutory law requires voluntary
informed consent to testing and treatment, 2 confidentiality protections for testing
persons at risk,3 medical judgment to determine who should be tested for Human
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) infection, 4 reportage of HIV-positive test results to
public health registries, 5 and health department development of protocol.
6
* Comments and correspondence concerning this Article may be sent to Professor Hartman at
Duquesne University in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, hartmanrg@duq.edu, where she has a faculty
appointment in the School of Law and in the Health Care Ethics Program. Professor Hartman also
teaches at the University of Pittsburgh School of Medicine, where she is affiliated with the Center for
Bioethics and Health Law.
1. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.0037 (West 2002 & Supp. 2004) (declaring a public policy for
balancing medical necessity, privacy rights, and harm prevention).
2. E.g., ALA. CODE § 22-1 1A-51(a) (1997 & Supp. 2003); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-663(A) &
(B)(4) (West 2003 & Supp. 2003); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 120990 (West 1996 & Supp.
2004); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 § 1202(a)-(b) (1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.004(3) (West 2002 &
Supp. 2004); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 325-1 6 (a) (Michie 2000 & Supp. 2003); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-
41-6-1(a) (Michie 1993 & Supp. 2003); IOWA CODE ANN. § 141A.8 (West 1997 & Supp. 2004); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 214.181(5)(a) (Banks-Baldwin 1992 & Supp. 2003); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
40:1300.13(A) (West 2001 & Supp. 2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 19203-A(l) (West 2002 &
Supp. 2003); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 11, § 70F (West 2003 & Supp. 2004); MONT. CODE. ANN. §
50-16-1007(1) (2003); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-531(1) & (2) (1996 & Supp. 2002); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 141-F:5 (1996 & Supp. 2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-07.5-02 (1) & (2) (2002 & Supp. 2003);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.242(A) (Anderson 2002 & Supp. 2003); 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
7606(b)(1)(ii) (West 2003 & Supp. 2003); R.I GEN. LAWS § 23-17-31(a) (1996 & Supp. 2002); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 70.24.330 (West 2002 & Supp. 2004); W.VA. CODE ANN. § 16-3C-2(a)(4), (c)
(Michie 2001 & Supp. 2003).
3. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-663(B)(3) (West 2003 & Supp. 2003); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
381.004(3)(a) (West 2002 & Supp. 2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-47 (1995 & Supp. 2003); HAW. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 325-16(c) (Michie 2000 & Supp. 2003); 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 305/6 (West 1997 &
Supp. 2004); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1300.13E (West 2001 & Supp. 2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 5, § 19203 (West 2002 & Supp. 2003); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2782 (McKinney 2002 & Supp.
2004); W.VA. CODE ANN. § 16-3C-3(a)(5) (Michie 2001 & Supp. 2003); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 252.15(5)
(2004).
4. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-1IA-52 (1997 & Supp. 2003); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-
663(D)(5) (West 2003 & Supp. 2003); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.004(3) (West 2002 & Supp. 2004);
HAW. REV. STAT. Ann. § 325-16(b)(5)-(6) (Michie 2000 & Supp. 2003); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-41-6-
1 (b)(1) (Michie 2001 & Supp. 2003); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-16 (2001 & Supp. 2003); MONT. CODE
AIDS AND ADOLESCENTS
Statutes that aim to protect public health and safeguard personal privacy
interests largely exclude those most at risk for HIV infection and AIDS -
adolescents.7 Adolescents (fourteen through seventeen) constitute a subset of
minors, defined by law as persons under eighteen years and presumed to lack
decision-making ability. 8 This presumption derives from anecdotal assertion about
vulnerability and decisional incapacity and is at odds with prevailing social and
scientific evidence. 9 Anecdotal assertion does not legitimize the legal disparity in
decision-making stature to substantiate extensive state restriction on adolescent
decisional liberty. Adolescent decisional liberty remains unexamined in the
context of AIDS. Adolescents have not been the focus of scholarly writing and
policy analysis about HIV decision making, yet they merit specialized attention
due to their distinction as an HIV-infected group reaching crisis proportion and to
the complexities in law related to their decisional ability.
While the disabled legal status of adolescents may explain, in part, their
absence from legislative priority, a paradigmatic shift in the progression of AIDS
compels policy attention directed toward the unprecedented rise of HIV infection
among adolescents mainly attributed to transmission by sexual activity.'
0
Complicating this is the long-standing legal supposition that adolescents are
ANN. § 50-16-1007(l)(c)(iii) (2003); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141-F:5V (1996 & Supp. 2003); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.242(E)(5) (Anderson 2002 & Supp. 2003).
5. Eg., ARIZ. REV. STAT. Ann. § 36-663(B)(5) (West 2003 & Supp. 2003); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 25-4-1405(3) (West 2001 & Supp. 2003); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.004(3)(e)(5), (15) (West 2002
& Supp. 2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-22-9.2(b) (2001); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 19203 (West
2002 & Supp. 2003); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-29-80 (Law. Co-op. 2002 & Supp. 2003).
6. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-4-1405(3) (West 2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.004(8)
(West 2002 & Supp. 2004); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 325-16(e) (Michie 2004); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
214.181(6) (Banks-Baldwin 1992 & Supp. 2003); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1300.16 (West 2001);
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2786 (McKinney 2002); W.VA. CODE ANN. § 16-3C-2(e)(2) (Michie 2001 &
Supp. 2003).
7. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, FACTS ABOUT ADOLESCENTS AND
HIV/AIDS (March 1998) (noting that as many as 50% of new HIV cases in the U.S. may be people
under age 25, and as many as 25% may be people under age 22), available at
http://www.thebody.com/cdc/hivteen.html (last visited June 5, 2004).
8. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979); see generally Rhonda Gay Hartman, Coming of
Age: Devising Legislation for Adolescent Medical Decision-Making, 28 AM. J. L. & MED. 409 (2002).
9. See Marilyn Jacobs Quadrel et al., Adolescent (In)vulnerability, 48 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 102,
111 (1993) (reproving policies "based on anecdotal observations and cultural presumptions about
adolescents"); William Gardner & Janna Herman, Adolescents' AIDS Risk Taking: A Rational Choice
Perspective, 50 NEW DIRECTIONS FOR CHILD DEV. 17, 19 (1990) (explaining that "contrary to popular
belief, there is little evidence that adolescents lack the information-processing capacity to make rational
decisions").
10. See Comm. on Pediatric AIDS and Comm. on Adolescence, Am. Acad. Of Pediatrics,
Adolescents and Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection: The Role of the Pediatrician in Prevention
and Intervention, 107 PEDIATRICS 188 (2001); Susan G. Millstein, Risk Factors For AIDS Among
Adolescents, 50 NEW DIRECTIONS FOR CHILD DEV. 3, 4-5 (1990); Catherine Lewis et al., School-Based
Primary Prevention: What is an Effective Program? 50 NEW DIRECTIONS FOR CHILD DEV. 35, 36
(1990).
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incapable of decision making, despite recognition of adolescent decisional
autonomy for criminal responsibility," tort and contract liability, 2 medical
decision making for certain conditions, such as substance abuse and venereal
disease, 13 and in social situations such as marriage or high school graduation.
4
State statutes aimed toward AIDS are virtually silent as to adolescents. Those
that mention adolescents routinely require parent notification and consent that
obscure privacy protection for access to testing and treatment. 15 State-engineered
notification and consent barriers contravene policy objectives for HIV reduction
and detract from adolescent decision-making development. By not protecting
adolescent privacy in accessing health care, lawmakers miss an important
opportunity to advance state parens patriae power toward the development of
adolescent decision-making ability in the context of HIV. Vigilance by lawmakers
is required to remove - rather than erect - barriers to responsible decision making
by adolescents in the prevention and reduction of HIV infection and AIDS. A
practical, comprehensive approach is needed for charting consistent policy over a
range of issues related to adolescent medical decision making for testing and
treatment. Indeed, the crisis of HIV infection among adolescents constitutes an
opportunity for policymakers to establish a model framework on which laws
related to adolescent decision making in health care generally may be based. A
significant step toward this end requires close scrutiny of current statutory law in
order to identify shortcomings and challenge underlying policy assertions that pose
11. See ARIZ. REv. STAT. Ann. § 8-341(E) (West 1999 & Supp. 2003); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 405/5-101 (West 1999 & Supp. 2004); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-05 (2002); 42
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6355 (West 2003 & Supp. 2003); accord 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (2000).
12. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 6600 (West 1994); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-1-201, 305, 306
(2003). For a fuller discussion of adolescent legal autonomy in the context of tort and contract liability,
see Rhonda Gay Hartman, Adolescent Autonomy: Clarifying an Ageless Conundrum, 51 HASTINGS L. J.
1265, 1301-05 (2000).
13. E.g. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-133.01 (West 2003 & Supp. 2003) (substance abuse); CAL.
FAM. CODE §§ 6926, 6929 (West 1994 & Supp. 2004) (substance abuse, STDs); 410 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 210/4-4 (West 1997 & Supp. 2003) (substance abuse, STDs); MD. CODE ANN. HEALTH-GEN. I §
20-102(c) (2000 & Supp. 2003) (substance abuse, STDs); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12E (West
2003 & Supp. 2004) (substance abuse); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 521.14a (West 2003 & Supp. 2003)
(STDs); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4226 (2002 & Supp. 2003) (substance abuse and STDs); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 35-4-131 (Michie 2003) (STDs).
14. E.g., KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 214.185(3) (Banks-Baldwin 1992 & Supp. 2003) (marriage); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1503 (West 2004) (marriage); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 2-301(a)(2)
(1999 & Supp. 2003) (marriage); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12F (West 2003 & Supp. 2004)
(marriage or divorce); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-1-402(2)(a) (2003) (marriage or high school
graduation); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 2602(A)(1) (West 2004) (marriage); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §
10101 (West 1993 & Supp. 2003) (marriage or high school graduation); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.6-1
(1996) (marriage); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2969F (Michie 2002 & Supp. 2003) (marriage).
15. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-592(a) (West 2003); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §
333.5127(2) (West 2001); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-148(h) (2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-07.5-02(2)
(2002 & Supp. 2003).
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impediments to promoting adolescent health and preventing the spread of HIV
infection and AIDS.
Accordingly, Part I discusses statutory law aimed at HIV infection and AIDS
while Part II fleshes out deficiencies in this statutory law related to adolescents as a
high-risk group that compel increased legislative attention. Part III proposes
policy and procedure to enhance risk reduction and disease prevention for
adolescents. In so doing, Part III sets forth a framework for analyzing decisional
rights of adolescents and state interests compatible with both parens patriae and
due process.
I. STATUTORY LAW AND POLICY
Although the AIDS epidemic has captured public health and policy
attention, nearly half of the states have yet to enact legislation to address HIV
testing, treatment, and related issues. One reason may be the social stigma and
controversy associated with AIDS that offers a disincentive to lawmakers for
developing cohesive policy, delegating instead to state health departments the task
of promulgating protocol. Closely allied is an assumption by lawmakers that
issues attendant to the AIDS crisis will be effectively dealt with by health
departments. States that have enacted statutes aimed at HIV issues elucidate public
policy to promote confidential voluntary testing and counseling for HIV infection
in order to reduce risk for spread of the disease and increase awareness about
treatment and prevention.' 6  These statutes typically include provisions for
informed consent, testing and counseling that triggers confidentiality, reportage by
health care providers to state registries, and dissemination of information for risk-
reduction education and disease prevention. Of these states, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Delaware, Michigan, Montana, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio,
West Virginia, and Wisconsin mention minors.1
7
A. Testing and Treatment
States that address HIV infection and AIDS encourage voluntary testing.
1 8
Prior to testing, providers must engage decisionally-capable persons in a consent
16. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
17. E.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 121020(a)(1) (West 1996); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §
25-4-1405(6) (West 2001 & Supp. 2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-592 (West 2003); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 16, § 1202(f) (2003); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.5127 (West 2001); MONT. CODE. ANN.
§ 50-16-1007(8) (2003); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-2B-3 (Michie 2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-148(h)
(2003); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3701.242(B) (Anderson 2002 & Supp. 2003); W.VA. CODE ANN. §
16-3C-2(e)(2) (Michie 2001 & Supp. 2003); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 252.15(2) (West 2004).
18. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-594 (West 2003); R.I. GEN LAWS § 23-11-17 (1996 &
Supp. 2002) (requiring physicians to offer HIV testing to "all persons" and pre- and post-test counseling
to coincide with medical standards).
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process. According to Delaware's statutory scheme, that informed consent shall
include an explanation of the nature of AIDS and manifestations of HIV infection,
behaviors known to pose risk for transmission, purposes and potential uses of HIV
test results, the manner and extent to which results will be kept confidential, and
withdrawal of consent to testing. 19 Yet, the legal disability of minors - despite any
actual decision-making capacity that may exist - routinely necessitates parent or
guardian consent for most medical testing and treatment, thus proscribing
physicians from accepting consent from adolescents.
Despite the disability barrier, some states permit adolescents to consent to
medical care for specific conditions such as substance abuse. 20 Fewer states afford
adolescents legal autonomy for mental health treatment 21 and for routine medical
22
care, usually with age restrictions. 2 Sexually transmitted diseases constitute a
condition for which states widely recognize legal autonomy of adolescents in order
to encourage testing and treatment.23  Most STD statutes omit any reference to
HIV testing,24 although in practice physicians extend policy underlying these
statutes to permit adolescent consent. One plausible explanation may be that the
absence of statutory protection for adolescent consent to HIV testing otherwise
discourages adolescents from accessing care and education concerning risk
reduction and prevention. Critical to physician consideration in allowing
19. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1202(b) (2003).
20. E.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-133.01 (West 2003 & Supp. 2003); CAL. FAM. CODE §
6929(b) (West 1994 & Supp. 2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 37-7-8 (1995); 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
210/4 (West 1997 & Supp. 2003); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1096(A) (West 2001 & Supp. 2004);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12E (West 2003 & Supp. 2004); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
333.6121(1) (West 2001 & Supp. 2003); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-14 (2001); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §
1690.112 (West 1990 & Supp. 2003); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4226 (1982); WIS. STAT. § 51.47
(2003).
21. E.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 6924 (West 1994 & Supp. 2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-14c (West
2003); D.C. CODE ANN. § 7-1231.14 (2001 & Supp. 2003); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.4784 (West 2002 &
Supp. 2004); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-112 (2003); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 33.21 (McKinney
2002 & Supp. 2004); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.04 (Anderson 2004); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §
7201 (West 2001); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 51.14 (West 2003 & Supp. 2003).
22. E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-123b (2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.6-1 (1996).
23. E.g., ALA. CODE § 22-1 IA-19 (1997); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.025(4) (Michie 2002); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-132.01 (West 2003 & Supp. 2003); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-4-402(4) (West
2001 & Supp. 2003); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 710 (1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 384.30 (West 2002 &
Supp. 2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-17-7(a) (2001); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 577A-2 (Michie 1999);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 214.185(1) (Banks-Baldwin 1992 & Supp. 2003); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
40:1065.1(A) (West 2001 & Supp. 2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1823 (West 2004); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 144.343(1) (West 1998 & Supp. 2004); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-1-402(2)(c) (2003); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 9:17A-4 (West 2002 & Supp. 2003); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3709.241 (Anderson 2002
& Supp. 2003); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-532.1 (West 2004); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.610 (2003);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 521.14a (West 2003 & Supp. 2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23-16 (Michie
1994 & Supp. 2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-6-18 (1998); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4226 (1982); VA.
CODE ANN. § 54.1-2969E(1) (Michie 2002 & Supp. 2003); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-4-10 (Michie
2003). See also CAL. FAM. CODE § 6926 (West 1994 & Supp. 2004).
24. Cf. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.5127 (West 2001).
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adolescent consent is the deterrent effect that parent notification has on health care
access that is especially harmful given the increased incidence of HIV infection
among adolescents. Actual prevalence of infected adolescents is underestimated
because many adolescents do not get tested, which is not surprising given
adolescent aversion to accessing health care.25 Thus, as with STDs generally,
physicians afford adolescents autonomy in order to optimize treatment for a
condition with long-term and potentially fatal consequences. 6 There is some legal
policy support for this medical position. Michigan, for example, includes HIV in
statutes recognizing legally-valid consent by adolescents for STD testing and
27treatment, and Wyoming extends legal consent to persons under eighteen for the
examination and treatment of any STD infection.28
Several states expressly afford physicians latitude for recognizing valid
consent by a minor for HIV testing and treatment, provided they exercise
independent judgment regarding reasons that parent or guardian involvement vis-A-
vis consent requirements would impede testing and/or treatment.29 California and
Delaware, however, permit minors who are at least twelve years of age to consent
to HIV testing and post-test counseling.30 One state requires parental consent only
if the minor is under fourteen years,3 1 while others expand the scope of legally-
valid consent by minors without imposing any age restriction.32 Michigan and
Ohio, for instance, characterize consent by a minor as valid and binding as if
attaining adulthood, thereby alleviating legal concerns of practice liability by
physicians who accept consent by a minor, as well as financial liability by
25. Brian L. Wilcox, Federal Policy and Adolescent AIDS, 50 NEW DIRECTIONS FOR CHILD DEV.
61, 67 (1990). Noting that increased incidence of adolescent infection is due, in part, to the long
incubation period, William G. Buss reasons, "[slince the incidence of AIDS in young adults is high and
the incubation period for AIDS (the second phase) is long, it must be true that many known cases of
AIDS in young adults represent HIV infection that began during teenage years." William G. Buss,
Human Immunodeficiency Virus, the Legal Meaning of "Handicap, " and Implications for Public
Education Under Federal Law at the Dawn of the Age of the ADA, 77 IOWA L. REV. 1389, 1400 (1992).
26. See Rhonda Gay Hartman, Adolescent Decisional Autonomy for Medical Care: Physician
Perceptions and Practices, 8 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 87, 111 (2001) (reporting that physicians
consider seriousness of medical condition as a factor influencing whether to honor adolescent patient
decisions).
27. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.5127 (West 2001).
28. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-4-131(a) (Michie 2003).
29. See infra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
30. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 121020(a)(1) (West 1996). Both Delaware and Montana
recognize a minor's refusal of HIV testing and/or post-test counseling in addition to consent. DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1202(f) (2003); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-16-1007(8) (2003).
3 1. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 252.15(2)(a)(4)(a) (West 2004).
32. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-4-1405(6) (West 2001 & Supp. 2003); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 333.5127(l) (West 2001); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-2B-3 (Michie 2000); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
3701.242(B) (Anderson 2002 & Supp. 2003).
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parents. 33 Still, Michigan affords latitude to medical judgment for informing a
parent or guardian notwithstanding the minor's express refusal.34
Indicating preference for parental guidance during the minor's consent
process, a few states encourage consent by a parent or guardian unless a physician
determines and documents that such involvement would discourage the minor from
undergoing testing and treatment. 35 As a requisite to testing a minor in the absence
of a parent, North Carolina obligates physicians to document that they reasonably
suspect the minor is infected and that consent by a parent or guardian is not
forthcoming. 36 Yet, North Carolina does not recognize adolescent legal autonomy.
Rather, it authorizes doctors to determine that such testing is medically necessary
in the circumstances. Once physicians document medical necessity, they may treat
an HIV-infected minor in the absence of parental involvement, although it is
unclear whether physicians must document this determination each time the
adolescent accesses treatment. HIV infection necessitates continuity of care and
treatment by health care providers, conceivably necessitating multiple
determinations of medical necessity until the adolescent achieves the age of
majority.
B. Notification and Privacy
In states where legislators authorize valid consent by minors for HIV
testing, notification to parents or guardians either before or after testing is left to
physician judgment as to whether it would thwart treatment altogether or even
dissuade an adolescent from accessing or continuing treatment. 37  Should a
physician document reasons why parental notification would be ineffective,
Connecticut, for example, recognizes the minor's consent as legally valid,
attaching personal liability to the minor for costs incurred. 8 In a similar vein,
Michigan delegates a degree of discretion to physicians regarding notification to
inform a parent or guardian about an adolescent's HIV testing or treatment. While
not obligating physicians to notify parents or guardians, the statute permits
physicians to disclose information to them, should a physician adjudge notification
33. MICH. COMP LAWS ANN. § 333.5127(1) (West 2001); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.242(B)
(Anderson 2002 & Supp. 2003).
34. MICH. COMP LAWS ANN. § 333.5127(2) (West 2001). Accord COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-4-
1405(6) (West 2001 & Supp. 2003).
35. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-592(a) (West 2003); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 130A-148(h)
(2003).
36. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-148(h) (2003).
37. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-592(a) (West 2003).
38. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-592(b) (West 2003).
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as appropriate.39  The statute, however, is devoid of factors to guide medical
judgment as to the inappropriateness for contacting a parent or guardian.
Notification provisions reflect, in substantial measure, the concern by state
legislatures for greater parental involvement with adolescents. Legislative concern
for parental involvement is juxtaposed, however, with concern for confidential
HIV testing and treatment. Statutes that recognize a minor's consent to HIV
testing occasionally include privacy protection, illustrated by Connecticut's statute
that mandates confidentiality for consultation, examination, and treatment of a
minor for HIV infection. 40 Implicit to statutory provisions according valid legal
consent to minors for HIV testing and treatment is privacy protection for test
results and communications, as part of "acceptable medical standards.' As a
public health contagion, physicians are required to report HIV-positive test results
42to state registries, similar to reportage of STDs generally. Should disclosure of
HIV-related information exceed reportage requirements, civil and criminal
penalties may attach. Unauthorized disclosure of HIV-related information
constitutes a misdemeanor of the first degree in Florida and Wisconsin,43 for
instance, although it is unclear whether this sanction applies when the privacy
violation pertains to a minor. Wisconsin also provides recourse for privacy
violations through civil remedies that can include attorney fees and exemplary
damages, though once again it is unclear whether such recourse includes minors.4
Other states proscribe violations of statutory privacy protections through
professional disciplinary action against the health care provider.45
C. Pregnancy and Parenthood
Generally, state law affords pregnant adolescents autonomy for health care
decision making.46 The scope of adolescent legal autonomy includes testing and
39. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.5127(2) (West 2001). But see CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-
592(a) (West 2003) (requiring confidentiality to the consultation, examination, and treatment of a
minor, which shall not be divulged without the minor's consent).
40. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-592(a) (West 2003).
41. RI. GEN. LAWS § 23-11-17(c) (1996 & Supp. 2002).
42. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-663(B)(5) (West 2003); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
381.004(3)(e)(5), (15) (West 2002 & Supp. 2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-22-9.2(b) (2001); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 19203 (West 2002); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-29-80 (Law. Co-op. 2002 & Supp.
2003).
43. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.004(6)(a)-(b) (West 2002 & Supp. 2004); WrS. STAT. ANN. § 252.15(9)
(West 2004).
44. WIS. STAT. ANN. §252.15(8) (West 2004). Accord HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 325-16(d)
(Michie 2000 & Supp. 2003).
45. E.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 214.181(8) (Banks-Baldwin 1992 & Supp. 2003).
46. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 743.065(1) (West 1996 & Supp. 2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-123
(2000); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17A-I (West 2002 & Supp. 2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2969G (Michie
2002 & Supp. 2003).
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treatment, as well as prenatal care. Legal autonomy for medical care by pregnant
adolescents is not restricted by the nature of condition or treatment; a priori, valid
legal consent by pregnant adolescents extends to HIV testing and treatment.
Underscoring policy concerns of transmittal by an infected mother to a fetus of this
"serious and unique danger to public health and welfare, 47 several state statutes
address decisional autonomy of pregnant adolescents regarding HIV tests and
48treatment. By respecting a pregnant minor's confidential consent to testing,
subject only to medical providers' mandatory disclosure requirements to state
health departments, these statutes evidence a degree of policymaking attention to
promoting risk reduction and disease prevention by adolescents. To this end, a few
states require physicians and other health care professionals to provide information
to pregnant minors about the benefits of testing for HIV.49 Other states merely
direct medical providers to advise every pregnant woman about HIV testing and
counseling, 50 although adolescent patient care should be targeted given the high-
risk status of adolescents for HIV infection and optimum perinatal transmission.
II. LEGISLATIVE DEFICIENCIES
While legislative efforts aimed at formulating and furthering policy
concerning HIV infection are laudable, the means to policy advancement is
problematic as it relates to adolescents. First, the continuing spread of the disease
among adolescents commands heightened attention by policymakers to privacy
protections if goals of disease prevention and risk reduction are to be realized. In
fact, the actual prevalence of HIV infection among adolescents is unknown
because few adolescents access testing, obviating these policy goals. According to
researchers, "the prevalence of AIDS in adolescents reflects a cumulative pattern
of infection and thus underestimates the current prevalence of infected
individuals.' Compounding these concerns is complexity attendant to legal
decision-making autonomy by adolescents, which is evidenced by marked variance
among state laws. Second, states that provide statutory guidance to health care
professionals regarding HIV treatment and AIDS overlook the opportunity to
establish coherent policy in the testing and treatment of adolescents to foster public
policy generally with respect to HIV/AIDS and especially in the care of
47. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.0037 (West 2002 & Supp. 2004); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 214.600
(Banks-Baldwin 1992 & Supp. 2003).
48. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-594a (West 2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:5C-16 (West
2003).
49. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:5C-16 (West 1996). Compare with CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-
594a (West 2003) (delegating discretion to the state public health department to develop training
programs for health care providers in order to discuss the benefits of HIV testing with those who are
pregnant or are parents with newborns).
50. E.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-13-19(a)-(b) (1996); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-5-703(a) (2001).
51. Millstein, supra note 10, at 3.
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adolescents as a high-risk group. In spite of - and to some extent because of -
deficiencies, these statutes serve as a cohort for examination in order to flesh out
the problems, while identifying points that invite increased attention by both legal
policymakers and health care providers in the areas of privacy, protocol
development, and personal decision making.
A. Privacy Protections
Protecting patient privacy is a primary responsibility of health care
providers. Patient privacy, coterminous to confidentiality, is the touchstone of the
patient-physician relationship. Should a physician disclose a patient's private
information without consent, adverse action from institutional and professional
disciplinary review can result, including sanctions pursuant to state licensure
requirements, 52 common law claims for invasion of privacy and breach of
confidentiality,5 3 and lack of funding for violating federal law enacted to prevent
fraud and abuse in the maintenance of patient records. 4 Inherent to professional
responsibility for safeguarding patient information is personal dignity, as well as
practice enhancement with patients who are more likely to divulge intimate
information and trust providers when they perceive that confidences will be
maintained.55
Confidentiality is especially important to adolescents, as several
researchers have found. One study reports that adolescents regard confidentiality
as critical when deciding whether to access health care.56 Adolescent perception
that physicians will not safeguard confidential communications concerning their
condition provides a disincentive for accessing care, which deters testing for HIV.
This exacerbates risks associated with HIV infection by delaying treatment, which
is detrimental to adolescents because early use of combination regimens of
antiretroviral medications can relieve HIV-related symptoms and prolong survival.
52. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1720(a)(4) (1997); IDAHO CODE § 54-1806A(6) (Michie
2003); 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 15/15 (West 1998 & Supp. 2003); IOWA CODE ANN. § 148.6 (West
1997 & Supp. 2004); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 5 (West 2003 & Supp. 2004); MISS. CODE
ANN. 73-25-28 (2000 & Supp. 2003); MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-3-401 (2003); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
329:26 (2003); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.22(4) (Anderson 2002 & Supp. 2003); OR. REV. STAT. §
677-141(3) (2003); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-37.3-7 (1999); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 36-4-29 (Michie 1999 &
Supp. 2003).
53. See Wheeler v. Commissioner of Social Services, 662 N.Y.S.2d 550, 553 (N.Y. App. Div.
1997).
54. See generally Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 1320d
(2000 & Supp. 2003).
55. As one state court explained, "[t]he patient whose privacy and sensibilities are safeguarded
will be the more likely to reveal information that will result in improvement or cure. This benefits the
individual and, in turn, the community and, ultimately, the population." Wheeler, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 553.
56. Kenneth R. Ginsburg et al., Adolescents' Perceptions of Factors Affecting Their Decisions to
Seek Health Care, 273 JAMA 1913, 1917 (1995).
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For adolescents who access care, it censures complete candor, creating difficulty
for physicians to diagnose conditions and to encourage patient compliance.
The importance of confidentiality in adolescent patient care cannot be
underestimated. Physicians protect it, even when there may be question as to legal
vulnerability in the event of challenge by a parent or guardian. 57 While reported
cases do not indicate a successful challenge by a parent or guardian to a physician
safeguarding adolescent patient confidentiality, they do signal a trend toward
supporting providers' attempts to protect adolescent privacy when it collides with
parents' interests in obtaining information.58 This trend is consistent with the
contemporary adolescent-centered approach to parental rights and entitlements,
which yield to interests most beneficial to minors.59 Competing interests of
adolescent confidentiality and parent involvement occasionally converge in
statutory provisions that permit physicians to recognize consent by adolescent
patients as legally valid, while requiring notification to parents and/or disclosure of
information to parents upon their request without adolescent assent.
60
While it is clear that parent notification requirements derive from policy that
seeks to promote family harmony, 6 1 less clear is what policy should be given
priority by physicians when they believe parental involvement poses a barrier to
care. By not prioritizing among policy goals in the event of conflict, statutory
requirements can compromise care that physicians deem appropriate for their
adolescent patients. In fact, many physicians rate family support as a less
persuasive justification for disclosing confidential patient information and opt to
facilitate adolescent decision making about the degree of parental involvement,
concluding that such involvement would be more supportive and sustaining as a
result of adolescent amenability. 62 There is empirical support for this position, as
studies suggest adolescent receptiveness to adult involvement when they perceive
that adults regard seriously their views and they will, in their own right, consult
57. Hartman, supra note 26, at 112-13.
58. Hartman, supra note 26, at 115.
59. See generally Marsha Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making: An Interpretive Approach to
the Determination of Legal Parentage, 113 HARV. L. REV. 835 (2000). In addition to custody,
visitation, and support agreements, technological conception arrangements have likewise yielded to
minors' best interests. See Joan G. Wexler, Rethinking the Modification of Child Custody Decrees, 94
YALE L.J. 757 (1985); Note, Looking for a Family Resemblance: The Limits of the Functional
Approach to the Legal Definition of Family, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1640 (1991). See also Jhordan C. v.
Mary K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (Cal. App. 1986).
60. E.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 6929(c) (West 1994 & Supp. 2004); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §
333.5127(2) (West 2001). But see CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-592(a) (West 2003) (providing that a
physician shall not notify the minor's parents if he determines that notification will result in the minor
not seeking treatment, or if the minor asks that his/her parents not be notified).
61. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 6929 (West 1994 & Supp. 2004).
62. See Hartman, supra note 26, at 113, 124-25.
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with a parent. 63 Cast in this light, tension in policy aims of adolescent privacy and
parent involvement are largely illusory, as physicians may achieve both goals in
the absence of parent notification and consent provisions.
Lack of prioritization among policy goals also tends to circumvent existing
policy on which these statutes are based. Policy goals of disease prevention and
risk reduction may be thwarted when statutes are devoid of express privacy
protections that include sanctions for disclosure of information beyond the scope of
reporting requirements. Actually, few statutes enacted to prevent the spread of
HIV infection include sanctions for health care practitioners who violate
confidentiality of HIV-infected patients, aiming to reduce the tendency of
discriminatory or derogatory treatment.64 Sanctions for privacy violations suggest
respect and dignity by policymakers for those persons undergoing HIV testing by
deterring vindictive, biased, or arbitrary action toward HIV-infected persons.
Sanctions may also alleviate self-inhibitors for those persons considering whether
to undergo HIV testing. Yet, statutes that afford legal protection to a minor's
consent to HIV testing typically omit any reference to confidentiality. 65
Because privacy is crucial, state legislators should respond to cues from
66case law when crafting statutory provisions related to adolescent patient care.
Cases that progress to trial and appellate court decision offer exceptional
opportunities for understanding issues attendant to adolescent decision making.
Although adolescent decision-making liberty for HIV testing and treatment has yet
to be considered by courts, an opinion rendered by the Colorado Court of Appeals
is worth examining. In John Doe v. High-Tech Institute Inc.,67 an adolescent
student in a medical assistant training program confided to his instructor that he
had tested positive for HIV.6 s The student asked his instructor to maintain the
63. See Sharon R. Beier et at., The Potential Role of an Adult Mentor in Influencing High-Risk
Behaviors in Adolescents, 154 ARCHIVES OF PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 327, 330 (2000); Bruce
Ambuel & Julian Rappaport, Developmental Trends in Adolescents' Psychological and Legal
Competence to Consent to Abortion, 16 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 129, 150-151 (1992).
64. Florida and Wisconsin are notable exceptions. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.004(6)(a) (West 2002
& Supp. 2004); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 252.15(9) (West 2004). See also supra notes 43-44 and
accompanying text.
65. Cf. CONN. GEN. STAT. Ann. § 19a-592 (West 2003) (mandating privacy protection for
adolescents by stating that information related to consultation, examination, and treatment of a minor
"shall not be divulged without the minor's consent, including the sending of a bill for the services to
any person other than the minor until the physician consults with the minor").
66. See Hartman, supra note 8, at 433 (stating that court opinions "provide important cues for
points that compel research through scientific method to inform and to illuminate understanding by
policy-makers"); Rhonda Gay Hartman, Dying Young: Cues from the Courts, 158 ARCHIVES OF
PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 615 (2004) (discussing a range of issues identified by courts related
to adolescent decision making for end-of-life care).
67. 972 P.2d 1060 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998).
68. Id. at 1064.
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confidentiality of his communication concerning the test result.69 Shortly
thereafter, the instructor informed the entire class of a mandatory test for rubella, to
which students consented with the understanding that the blood test would be used
exclusively for that purpose.7 ° Without the student's knowledge or consent, the
instructor requested the laboratory to test the student's blood for HIV. 7 The test
yielded a positive result, which the lab reported to the public health registry in
compliance with state law.72
The student instituted a lawsuit against the college and his instructor,
claiming invasion of privacy based on a privacy interest in his blood sample and
the information derived from it. 73  The defendants took the position that the
unauthorized test was minimal, rather than offensive as a privacy intrusion and
therefore not cognizable under state law.74 The trial court agreed, dismissing the
student's claim. 75 The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed, finding it reasonable
and thus cognizable as a legal claim for a person to expect seclusion of medical
information obtained from a blood sample.76 The appellate court reasoned that, in
addition to physical intrusion by extracting a human blood sample, the
unauthorized HIV testing of the sample was "sensitive" because it concomitantly
involved "strong social stigma" against infected persons.77 Accordingly, the
Colorado appellate court recognized a heightened need to seclude such "highly
personal" information, and that common law privacy protects decision making
about HIV testing.
78
By extending legal protection to adolescents for privacy interests in HIV
testing that includes decision making regarding the seclusion of information,
appellate courts highlight adolescent privacy interests in medical information as
distinct from those of parents, especially when interests clash. In so doing, these
decisions represent a shift in socio-legal perception concerning what is most
beneficial to adolescents that coincide with the contemporary child-centered legal
approach to parent rights and entitlements regarding their children. 79 Attorney Ad
Litem for D.K. v. Parents of D.K.8 ° is a paradigmatic example of parent rights and





73. Doe v. High Tech Inst., Inc., 972 P.2d 1060, 1064 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1071-72.
77. Id. at 1070.
78. Id. at 1070-71.
79. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
80. 780 So.2d 301 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
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D.K. were in the throes of divorce litigation, precipitated by the mother who
believed the father had sexually abused D.K.8' The state family court ordered
psychological counseling sessions due to the ensuing custody dispute." Both
parents sought to access D.K.'s mental health records that reflected discussions
with her therapist during the counseling sessions, and the court-appointed guardian
ad litem filed a motion for a protective order, maintaining that only D.K., not her
parents, could waive the privilege to confidential information.83 The trial court
denied the motion, finding parental waiver valid. 4
The Florida appellate court reversed.85 Acknowledging the traditional
presumption in law that adolescents lack capacity for autonomous decision
making, the court reasoned that "not all decisions are removed from a minor,"
citing Florida statutory and common law examples such as abortion decision
making, mental health decision making, and minors' presumed ability to invoke
and waive constitutional rights including the privilege against self-incrimination
and the right to an attomey. 86 Recognizing that adolescents possess an emotional
maturity and capacity not present in minors under fourteen years, the Florida
appellate court ruled that D.K., rather than her parents, was entitled to assert the
statutory privilege of confidentiality. 87 The court limited its ruling to the facts
presented, stating that courts should employ a case-by-case approach to determine
whether a minor asserting a confidentiality privilege is "sufficiently mature. ' 88
Commending to the state legislature "a more comprehensive review of the
substantial policy issues" presented by D.K.'s case, the court acknowledged
"tension apparent in the law" between the rights and responsibilities of parents and
the rights of adolescents.8 9 While underscoring the pivotal role of parents in
adolescent life, the court recognized that parents also inhibit minors from seeking
or succeeding in treatment.
90
81. Id. at 303.
82. Id. at 304.
83. Id.
84. Id at 304.
85. Id. at 310.
86. Attorney Ad Litem for D.K. v. Parents of D.K., 780 So.2d 301, 305-08 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2001).
87. Id; see also S.C. v. Guardian Ad Litem, 845 So.2d 953 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (ruling that a
14-year-old minor possessed a right to assert privilege in the confidential communications with her
psychotherapist).
88. Attorney Ad Litemfor D.K., 780 So.2d at 308. Maturity is commonly invoked by courts as an
indicator for legal protection of adolescent decision making, without sufficiently clarifying or defining
it. See Hartman, supra note 26, at 105.
89. Attorney Ad Litem for D.K, 780 So.2d at 310.
90. Id
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B. Protocol Development
State statutes cede protocol development for HIV testing and treatment to
health departments to formulate a precise and detailed set of guidelines. 9' Protocol
development enhances the delivery of health services by promoting just and
uniform approaches to patient care.92 Typically, these provisions encourage health
departments to design and implement comprehensive training programs for health
care providers that may include instruction on the benefits of HIV testing and
related confidentiality. 93  In contrast to simply encouraging health department
development for protocol, one state mandates "model protocol... for counseling
and testing persons for the human immunodeficiency virus... includ[ing] criteria
for evaluating a patient's risk.. .and for offering.. .testing, on a voluntary basis"
while acceding wide discretion to the state health department for crafting "model
protocol. 94
Statutory delegation to state health departments for protocol development
related to adolescents is problematic for several reasons. First, in the absence of
any accompanying provision that creates an incentive to craft protocol, such as
funding and time-frame restrictions, it is uncertain whether protocol will actually
be promulgated, resulting in an absence of guidelines for HIV testing and
treatment. Second, should a health department eventually establish protocol, it is
unlikely to address adolescents as a distinct group at risk. Coupled with urgency in
reducing HIV infection among adolescents, these reasons question the
appropriateness for assigning protocol development to a state instrumentality,
rather than developing it through a statutory structure that results from democratic
process.
Even assuming protocol promulgation by health departments, the process for
protocol development is suspect by lacking assurances for careful and
comprehensive consideration of the issues specific to adolescent testing and
treatment. State agencies derive authority from statutory structure. Statutes aimed
toward HIV infection usually omit testing and treatment for adolescents and
limited statutory recognition for adolescent legal decision-making autonomy is
91. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. Ann. § 25-4-1405(3) (West 2001 & Supp. 2003); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
381.004(8) (West 2002 & Supp. 2004); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 325-16(0 (Michie 2000 & Supp.
2003); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §214.181(6) (Banks-Baldwin 1992 & Supp. 2003); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:1300.16 (West 2001 & Supp. 2004); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2786 (McKinney 2002 & Supp.
2004); W.VA. CODE ANN. § 16-3C-2(e)(2) (Michie 2001 & Supp. 2003).
92. For a discussion of protocol necessity in a specific context of medical services, see Rhonda
Gay Hartman, Tripartite Triage Concerns: Issues for Law & Ethics, 31 CRITICAL CARE MED. SUPP.
S358, S359-S360 (May 2003) (advancing reasons why protocol development is essential in the critical
care context when prioritizing patients).
93. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-4-1405(2) (West 2001 & Supp. 2003).
94. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.004(8) (West 2002 & Supp. 2004). Accord TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE ANN. § 85.08 1(a) (Vernon 2001 & Supp. 2004).
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often subject to physician discretion. 95 Given the disparity in decision-making
status premised on the long-standing supposition that adolescents are incapable of
decision making, it is unlikely that health department protocol will deal effectively
- if at all - with adolescent decisional rights. Department promulgation has not
dealt directly with adolescent decision making related to HIV testing and
treatment, instead delegating any allowance for adolescent consent to physician
judgment. Deferral to physician judgment, however, does not abdicate any
regulatory role and should not be seen as a reason to forego the advantage of
policy-related standards to guide medical judgment. Regulatory guidance would
also provide a framework within which to debate and resolve issues as they arise,
including the physician's role in adolescent health care for HIV testing and
treatment - particularly the consent process, extent of confidentiality protection,
and continuity of care - that remains unexamined and requires thoughtful,
sustained attention.
Moreover, the legal presumption that minors, even in adolescence, are
incapable of decision making has become a sacrosanct principle, and should be
reshaped by democratic means, where legislative history and inferences drawn
from recorded deliberations increase confidence that expertise and experience in
adolescent patient care will be represented. Although levels of expertise may exist
within state health departments, those levels are likely limited to general health
policy and are less varied in both expertise and examination of issues attendant to
adolescents and their medical decision making. Acknowledging the lack of varied
expertise attendant to departments, Oklahoma recommends by statute the
convention of a multidisciplinary advisory committee to increase the likelihood
that expertise will inform issues.96 However, that recommendation is devoid of
any measure for ensuring accountability for representation of desired expertise in
specific areas.
In contrast, a participatory, legislative process affords greater exposure to
those with expertise regarding subtleties in adolescent development and decision
making. It also affords opportunities for exposure to knowledge acquisition by a
broader range of expertise germane to adolescent ability for decision making and
how those abilities should be reflected through a statutory regime furthering risk
reduction and disease prevention for HIV infection.97  Laws are made by
legislatures, and health departments derive authority to promulgate protocol from
95. See supra notes 18-28 and accompanying text.
96. See OKLA. STAT. Ann. tit. 63, § 1-502.2D (West 2004).
97. Issues requiring research and a contemplative approach include etiology of adolescent
socialization that gives way to health-related risks, social and biological determinants of risky
behaviors, and disposition of adolescents to HIV, including how their beliefs about AIDS may differ
from those of adults. See generally 50 NEw DIRECTIONS FOR CHILD DEV. (1990) (focusing on
adolescents in the AIDS epidemic).
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statutory structure; therefore, the most effective forum for advancing adolescent
decisional rights is the legislative process.
The openness of legislative hearings and records, moreover, is desirable when
issues in adolescent patient care are juxtaposed with an epidemic attached to social
stigma and discrimination. Deliberation and debate that provides a basis for
statutory enactment should be a product of a majoritarian process that ascribes
accountability to the state electorate, as well as to political retribution, and
represents a judgment reached by the citizenry through its elected representatives.
Especially when decisional rights are at stake, the Supreme Court has lauded the
distinct advantage of a legislative process, rather than department subdivision, to
sort out state interests that justify regulation.98 According to the Court, legislative
judgment is the most reliable index for contemporary values and evolving legal
norms because it is representative of those elected to draft and study policy
issues. 99 Thus, legislatures, rather than health departments, should formulate legal
policy related to decision making in matters of personal importance, including
decisions made by adolescents for HIV testing and treatment.
C. Adolescent Decision-making Autonomy
Current legislation aimed toward reducing the risk of HIV infection is also
deficient in its treatment - or lack thereof- of adolescent decision-making
autonomy. Few state statutes address the scope of legal autonomy afforded to
adolescents for accessing health care for HIV. Those that mention minors lack any
cohesive approach. 00 Even those statutes that legally protect decision making by
adolescents for STD treatment exclude HIV. l0 l  This oversight by legislators in
formulating legal policy for adolescent HIV decision making may reasonably be
attributed to the prevailing presumption in law that minors are decisionally
incapable.
Demarcation for presuming decisional capacity to exercise legal rights -
including constitutional guarantees for medical decision making - is eighteen
years. This presumptive incapacity differentiates adults' legal decisional rights
98. See generally, Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.Ct. 2472 (2003).
99. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002).
100. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1202(f) (2003) (stating that a minor 12 years of age or older
may consent or refuse consent to be subjected to HIV-related testing and counseling); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§130A-148(h) (2003) (providing physicians with authority to test a minor, once it is determined that the
parents either refuse to give consent and the physician reasonably suspects the minor has HIV or has
been sexually abused); N.D. CENT. CODE §23-07.5-02 (2002 & Supp. 2003) (requiring a parent or
guardian to consent for HIV testing of a minor); N.M. STAT. ANN. §24-2B-3 (Michie 2000)
(recognizing the capacity of minors to give informed consent to HIV testing); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§252.15(4)(b) (West 2004) (requiring parent or guardian consent only if the minor is younger than 14
years).
101. Cf MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §333.5127 (West 2001).
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from those of minors, whether six or sixteen. Research applying both Piagetian
and task-related schema reveals that decision-making ability of adolescents far
exceeds younger minors and is comparable, in several health care contexts, to
young adults. 10 2  Although more research is required to examine adolescent
decision making for HIV and related issues, existing empirical evidence does
challenge the validity of legislative adherence to presumptive decision-making
inability of adolescents, especially in a context of medical decision making where
minors are confronted with physical and psychological difficulties attendant to
serious, life-altering conditions. 0 3 This evidence also advances the necessity for
law-making attention to adolescents in order to devise statutes that accurately
reflect their ability and do not subordinate adolescent decision-making liberty to
that of adults in identical contexts.
Research that suggests decision-making ability of adolescents challenges the
constitutionality of laws that unduly restrict adolescents in their exercise of
decisional rights, such as medical decision making. The few state courts that have
considered this research invalidated statutes that restrict minors' decision making,
concluding that these statutes violate constitutional guarantees of privacy in
medical decision making where scientific and social-scientific evidence shows
comparable decision-making abilities of adolescents and young adults.' 0 4 Other
state courts have afforded legal protection to adolescent autonomy for medical
decision making, including refusal of life-sustaining treatment, by adopting a
mature minor doctrine and applying criteria of age, experience, and maturity in
judgment. 0 5 Even so, courts have urged state legislators to undertake policy
development of adolescent medical decision making.106
102. Ambuel & Rappaport, supra note 63, at 148; Catherine C. Lewis, A Comparison of Minors'
and Adults' Pregnancy Decisions, 50 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 446, 452 (1980); Quadrel et al., supra
note 9, at 112; David G. Scherer, The Capacities of Minors to Exercise Voluntariness in Medical
Treatment Decisions, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 431, 445 (1991); Paul V. Trad, The Ability of
Adolescents to Predict Future Outcome, 28 ADOLESCENCE 533, 550 (1993).
103. See Ambuel & Rappaport, supra note 63, at 148; Alfio Maggiolini, et al., Self-Image of
Adolescent Survivors of Long-term Childhood Leukemia, 22 J. PEDIATRIC HEMATOLOGY/ONCOLOGY
417, 419-20 (2002); David G. Scherer & N. Dickon Reppucci, Adolescents' Capacities to Provide
Voluntary Informed Consent: The Effects of Parental Influence and Medical Dilemmas, 12 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 123, 135 (1988).
104. Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797 (Cal. 1997). For a discussion of the case
law involving adolescents' competence in abortion decisions, see Preston A. Britner et al., Evaluating
Juveniles' Competence to Make Abortion Decisions: How Social Science Can Inform the Law, 5 U.
CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 35 (1998).
105. Belcher v. Charleston Area Medical Center, 422 S.E.2d 827 (W.Va. 1992); In re E.G., 549
N.E.2d 322 (111. 1989).
106. In re Application of Long Island Jewish Medical Center, 557 N.Y.S.2d 239, 243 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1990). Courts have also held parents with deeply-held religious conviction liable in the death of
adolescents in need of medical care. See Commonwealth v. Nixon, 761 A.2d 1151 (Pa. 2000).
Available scientific and social-scientific evidence is, however, inconclusive as to whether cognitive
development of adolescents raised in a restrictive religious environment is stunted by indoctrination
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Reported appellate court opinions that extend legal autonomy to adolescent
medical decision making cite to state statutes that compartmentalize adolescent
legal autonomy for specific conditions, such as venereal disease 10 7 and mental
health needs, 10 8 and in certain circumstances, such as homelessness'0 9 or military
enlistment."O These statutes reflect evolving norms that acknowledge adolescent
decision-making ability but lack any underlying cohesive framework for
adolescent decisional liberty. Variance among states and inconsistency of statutory
law in particular states explicate this. Pennsylvania, for example, authorizes
decision making by adolescents for mental health treatment,"' substance abuse," 
2
and STDs," 3 and in situations of marriage or high school graduation" 14 though not
for routine medical care in the absence of these situations. While Pennsylvania
fosters adolescent access for mental health treatment, it is only one of a small
minority of states that promote this policy through statutory recognition of legally-
valid consent by an adolescent." 
5
The AIDS epidemic emerging among adolescents compels attention by
legislators to chart consistent policy over a range of issues responsive to the special
needs of this population. Indeed, the crisis of HIV infection among adolescents
constitutes an opportunity for state lawmakers to fashion a framework on which
laws related to adolescent decision making in health care generally may be based.
State statutes affording legal autonomy to adolescents for substance abuse and
mental health decision making are indicative of increasing recognition of
when compared to adolescents raised in environments where there is exposure to diverse views. Note,
Children as Believers: Minors' Free Exercise Rights and the Psychology ofReligious Development,
115 HARV. L. REV. 2205 (2002). This point, not yet considered by courts, is worthy of empirical
exploration.
107. MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 333.5127 (West 2001).
108. E.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 6924 (West 1994 & Supp. 2004); COLO. REV. STAT. Ann. § 13-22-
101 (West 1997 & Supp. 2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-14c (West 2003); D.C. CODEANN. § 7-
1231.14 (Supp. 2004); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.4784 (West 2002); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-112
(2003); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 33.21 (McKinney 2002 & Supp. 2004); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
5122.04 (Anderson 2004); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50 § 7201 (West 2001); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 51.14 (West
2003).
109. E.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-132(A) (West 2003 & Supp. 2003).
110. Eg., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1503 (West 2004); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12F
(2003 & Supp. 2004).
111. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7201 (West 2001).
112. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1690.112 (West 1990 & Supp. 2003).
113. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 521.14a (West 2003).
114. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 10101 (West 2003).
115. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7201 (West 2003). See also CAL. FAM. CODE § 6924(b) (West 1994
& Supp. 2004); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §13-22-101 (West 2002 & Supp. 2003); D.C. CODE ANN. § 7-
1231.14(b) (2001 & Supp. 2003); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.4784 (West 2002 & Supp. 2004); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 53-21-112 (2003); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §33.21(c) (McKinney 2002 & Supp. 2004);
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 51.14(h) (West 2003).
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adolescent decision-making ability and a departure from rigid adherence to
unsupported assumptions. 1
6
III. BIFURCATED LEGISLATIVE ROLE: PARENSPATRIAE AND DUE PROCESS
The unprecedented rise in HIV infection among adolescents merits legislative
undertaking to retool parens patriae toward a cohesive policy framework that both
recognizes adolescent decision-making ability and ensures adequate due process.
Laws of other nations that afford legal autonomy to adolescents for medical
decision making should inform policymakers in this endeaver. l l 7 In developing
state parens patriae to undergird a comprehensive statutory structure with
procedural safeguards, policymakers should draw upon clinical expertise and forge
alliances with physicians, who play a vital role in adolescent care and in the AIDS
epidemic. Close collaboration is necessary to inform parens patriae development
and the due process that furthers it.
A. Development ofParens Patriae
The United States Supreme Court has identified vulnerability potential,
inability for incisive decision making, and a need to ensure a centralized parental
role as interests that permit legislators to regulate the rights of minors more
extensively than adults under a parens patriae power, or the power of the
government to promote the health and well-being of citizens. While the Supreme
Court has ruled that constitutionally-protected decisional liberty extends to minors,
the Court in Bellotti v. Baird invoked state interests in adolescent vulnerability,
decisional inability, and parental involvement to uphold statutory regulation of
adolescent abortion decision making. 18 In Parham v. JR, the Court employed
these same interests to find that federal due process was satisfied by scant statutory
requirement of parental consent and psychiatric evaluation of a minor prior to
involuntary civil commitment.1 19  Other than anecdotal observation about
adolescents generally, the Court in neither case drew upon any evidence to
strengthen these interests in application to the decision-making context at issue.
116. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002) (pinpointing that the "clearest and most
reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the country's
legislatures").
117. See Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 2483 (2003) (stating that government interests in the
United States are not necessarily more legitimate, when compared with other countries, in
circumscribing personal choice). For a summary of law in other countries, including Australia, Canada,
France, and the United Kingdom, that afford legal decision-making autonomy to adolescents for
medical care, see Hartman, supra note 12, at 1284 n. 84.
118. 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979) (upholding parental consent provision). See also Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (same); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981) (approving
parental notification requirement); Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292 (1997) (same).
119. 442 U.S. 584, 624 (1979).
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More specifically, the Court failed to differentiate among contexts - medical
care, criminal behavior, tortious activity, contractual agreements - when applying
these general interests to justify extensive state regulation of minors' decision
making compared with adults. These interests are arbitrary to maintain in the
absence of development in a concrete context. Nor did the Court clarify and
support the interests with evidence, other than collective conjecture and common
knowledge. A problem with common knowledge is that it tends to breed
complacency for critical thought and examination, demonstrated by state courts
that have reiterated these interests without accompanying analysis in medical
contexts to deny recognition for adolescent decision-making liberty.' 20 In addition
to slipshod analyses of adolescent decision-making liberty by state courts, cobbled
state legislation has resulted. This is demonstrated, in part, by an amalgam of
statutes that afford legal autonomy to adolescents for testing and treatment of most
STDs but not HIV, and permit adolescents to waive rights in the absence of
counsel in criminal proceedings, 12 1 but not to refuse unwanted medical care for
long-term illness, 22 when studies show that, in a medical care context, adolescents
appear as confident, emotionally stable, self-assured, and mature as some adults,
whose decision making is afforded legal protection in substantially similar
settings. 123
By failing to flesh out state interests of vulnerability, decisional inability,
parental involvement, the weight assigned these interests when evaluating
adolescent ability in a specific context, and that state parens patriae authority may
be better served by affording adolescents decision-making autonomy, the Supreme
Court lessened the potential for adolescent decisional rights development by not
requiring critical examination by state courts and legislatures of these interests in a
specific context. Ironically, members of the Court have suggested that its
assertions should be informed by objective facts and data to the extent possible,
admonishing that assertions "should not be, or appear to be, merely the subjective
views of individual Justices.' 24 Anecdotal, subjective assertions that support state
interests justifying extensive regulation of adolescent decision-making liberty call
into question the legitimacy of these interests in overriding adolescent liberty rights
to decide HIV testing and treatment. Notwithstanding this failure by the high
120. See In re Application of Long Island Jewish Medical Center, 557 N.Y.S.2d 239 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1990).
121. See, e.g., Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979); Ingram v. State, 918 S.W.2d 724 (Ark. Ct.
App. 1996). See also Hartman, supra note 12, at 1298-1301 (discussing inconsistencies in legal
treatment of adolescent rights in juvenile delinquency proceedings).
122. See, e.g., In re Application of Long Island Jewish Medical Center, 557 N.Y.S.2d 239 (N.Y.
.Sup. Ct. 1990) (holding that a non-mature minor cannot refuse a life-saving blood transfusion).
123. Ambuel & Rappaport, supra note 63, at 148-49; Scherer, supra note 102, at 444-45.
124. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 341 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Court, the opportunity exists for judicial and legislative development of adolescent
decisional liberty in this context.
Since Bellotti and Parham were decided, however, very few state courts have
analyzed these interests with scientific and social-scientific evidence. Courts that
have analyzed these interests in light of available evidence have found state
restriction of adolescent decisional liberty through parent notification and consent
provisions indefensible in areas of medical care and abortion. 25 It may be argued
that adolescent development depends, in important part, on the benefit derived
from involved parents who provide insight and guidance during a difficult time.
This argument is grounded on the assumption that state-initiated parental
involvement heightens this benefit. Yet, adolescents are shown to be capable of
communicating preference for adult involvement in their decision-making process;
usually it is parents to whom adolescents turn most for emotional support and
sustenance, and the quality of the involvement is maximal when adolescents
initiate it.
126
State interests of vulnerability, decisional inability, and parental involvement
based on implicit assumptions rather than supporting evidence lessens
persuasiveness of these interests. These interests do not legitimize the legal
disparity in decision-making stature to substantiate state restriction of adolescent
decision-making liberty in an HIV context. In fact, these interests argue against
the transferability of traditional state restrictions on minors' decision making for
medical care. Particularly in the area of HIV, there is a need for legislative
calibration of a comprehensive statutory scheme regarding adolescent decision-
making liberty that fosters decisional development through parens patriae.
The first interest employed by the Supreme Court to support state restriction
of adolescent decisional rights is "peculiar vulnerability."' 27 The Court has never
explained what is meant by the talismanic term, let alone clarified it for application
by lower courts and legislatures. Vulnerability suggests susceptibility to external
influences. While susceptibility to external influences is characteristic of most
persons throughout their lives, the concern is the degree of vulnerability. If, for
example, one is overly sensitized to the opinions of others, which reduces the
resolve to assert one's own choices, the ability to examine facts and evaluate
consequences of actions based on personal values may become clouded; thus,
vulnerability may impair capable decision making and activate state parens patriae
in a way to legitimize regulation.
Study of adolescents indicates that, in medical decision making, adolescents
are no more susceptible to external influences than are adults in identical situations
125. E.g., Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797 (Cal. 1997).
126. Ambuel & Rappaport, supra note 63, at 150-51.
127. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 623, 633 (1979).
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and suggests a presence of mind equivalent to young adults.' 28  Additionally,
adolescents have demonstrated remarkable levels of confidence and thoughtfulness
in their approach to decision making regarding serious illness, such as leukemia,
that sustains a solid basis for making other responsible decisions. 29 It may be
argued that vulnerability decreases with years and minors have less years of
experience to shape their potential for responsible decision making; however, this
argument is not necessarily transferable to health care settings where the nature of
the experience, rather than chronological age, appears to be a more reliable
indicator of cognitive development and mature judgment. 130
Disparate legal protection for medical decision making by adults and
adolescents is suspect in a health care environment, where vulnerability is common
throughout all age groups given diagnoses and diseases that engender perception of
helplessness and loss of control. HIV infection as a life-threatening affliction does
not translate to higher levels of vulnerability experienced by HIV-infected
adolescents than by adults. Although more research is needed, mere assumption
that HIV-infected adolescents are more vulnerable than adults when deciding
medical care in this context is not defensible. Existing research shows that
anecdotal observation about adolescent vulnerability is generally misplaced.' 3 ' It
may reasonably be contended that vulnerability results more from an inability to
access care for HIV infection rather than from the affliction itself, thereby
exacerbating helplessness and loneliness. Vulnerability that impacts decision-
making ability is actually reduced when persons are actively engaged in the course
of their medical care through unfettered access, affording them a greater sense of
self-control and connection with others, which also has been shown to reduce
irresponsible decision making and risk-taking behavior.' 32 Thus, state-engineered
barriers to care, such as parent notification provisions or no statutory provision that
affords legal autonomy to adolescents for HIV testing and treatment, undermine
policy objectives for health promotion and disease prevention.
Concern for vulnerability that is thought to impair decisional ability of
adolescents to decide medical care segues into the second state interest identified
by the Court - decision-making inability. Identified as a separate state interest, it
128. Scherer, supra note 102, at 444-45; Scherer & Reppucci, supra note 103, at 136.
129. Maggiolini et al., supra note 103, at 419-20. See also Scherer & Reppucci, supra note 103, at
135 (reporting that adolescents "reserv[e] the prerogative to make treatment decisions that have
consequential bearing on their lives" while being "mindful of their parents' wishes and social power").
130. See Hartman, supra note 8, at 444-45 (explaining that courts acknowledge experience with
illness to be a reliable indicator of maturity).
131. See Quadrel et al., supra note 9, at Ill (noting that teens see themselves at risk less often than
they see others at risk); Scherer & Reppucci, supra note 103, at 135 (concluding that adolescents are not
intimidated by the gravity or severity of treatment decisions). See also Gardner & Herman, supra note
9, at 19 (debunking the notion that adolescents "are driven helplessly by external psychic forces").
132. Beier et al., supra note 63, at 330-31; Ginsburg et al., supra note 56, at 1918; Scherer, supra
note 102, at 446.
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nonetheless subsumes vulnerability. Despite a legal presumption of decisional
inability, studies show adolescent capability of decision making and suggest
comparability with the decisional capacity of young adults in identical health care
contexts. 33  Capacity is an elusive standard that is comprised of ability to
understand information, deliberate rationally about information, and communicate
concerns and choices. It is also task-specific. The inquiry to determine who
possesses capacity is not whether one has achieved the standard ideally, but the
degree of divergence in a particular context that merits legal protection.' 34 For
example, studies of adolescents confronting unplanned pregnancy suggest maturity
in judgment comparable to young adults in the same situation. 135 According to
physicians, adolescents also show mature judgment in primary care settings. 136
While study of adolescent capability continues as a work in progress, studies
collectively suggest a capacity level for this age group compatible with legal
recognition for decision making. Prevailing research also suggests cognitive
capacity to a remarkable degree for medical decision making regarding serious
conditions, 37 weakening the Supreme Court's sweeping assertion that adolescents
lack capacity "for making life's difficult decisions."'138 Thus, blanket presumptions
by lawmakers - in the absence of supporting evidence - that adolescents are
incapable of making decisions about HIV infection are untenable.
Parental involvement, as the third interest recognized by the Court to justify
extensive state regulation of adolescent decisional rights, is not exclusive to state
restriction of those rights. Although parental involvement has been invoked to
curb legal recognition for adolescent autonomy to decide medical care, it actually
advances the position for affording legal autonomy to adolescents for medical
decision making, especially as applied to the context of HIV. The inclusion of
parents in an adolescent's decision-making process is a source of support for
adolescents as they consider benefits and burdens of choices for HIV infection that
present cumbersome, long-term treatment. Not only do adolescents seek out
parental involvement and advice in the absence of state imposition for parent
133. See, e.g., Ambuel & Rappaport, supra note 63, at 148 (finding "no age-related developmental
changes" in decision making capability between adolescents and young adults); Scherer, supra note
102, at 445 (observing that older adolescents are comparable to young adults in their reactions to
parental influence concerning medical decisions); Lewis, supra note 102, at 451 (reporting no major
differences in unplanned pregnancy decision making between adolescents and young adults).
134. Hartman, supra note 26, at 87-88.
135. See Lewis, supra note 102, at 448-49.
136. Hartman, supra note 26, at 108.
137. See Ambuel & Rappaport, supra note 63, at 148 (stating that study results suggest "that minors
remain competent decision makers when facing an emotionally challenging, real-world decision");
Scherer & Reppucci, supra note 103, at 135-36 (reporting that adolescents are more likely to resist
external influence when the gravity of the decisions presents serious implications for health).
138. Parham v. JR.. 442 U.S. 584. 602 (1979).
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notification by providers, 139 adolescent-initiated involvement is more likely to
advance state interests for enhancing their decisional development, concomitant to
closeness and companionship that underlie public policy for family harmony.
Physicians, who are poised to facilitate meaningful involvemfient by parents during
an adolescent's decision-making process, encourage adolescent-initiated parental
involvement. 140  The benefit derived from involved parents who provide insight
and guidance during a difficult time is thought indispensable to adolescent
development. This position has been grounded on the assumption that state-
initiated parental involvement heightens this benefit. However, adolescents
demonstrate capacity for communicating preference for adult involvement in their
decision-making process, and that involvement is maximal when adolescents
initiate it. 141
State-imposed requirements of parental involvement through notification and
consent provisions tend to deter access to medical care, 142 which is deleterious to
HIV-infected adolescents and, in turn, undermine state policy goals for reducing
infection and promoting adolescent health. In other words, legislators would more
effectively achieve policy aims through statutory provisions that afford decision-
making autonomy to adolescents and foster their self-sufficiency. Although it may
be contended that provisions according legal autonomy to adolescents would
disrupt the parent-child relationship by diminishing parental control, prevailing
research shows greater receptiveness to parental involvement by adolescents when
exercising autonomy because adolescents, in their own right, will integrate parents
into their decision-making process. 143 Viewed in this light, provisions affording
decision-making autonomy to adolescents are compatible with, not contrary to,
state policy for parental involvement. These provisions, however, should be
informed by clinical practice for incorporating parental involvement. Physicians
play an important role in encouraging adolescents to involve parents - to which
most adolescents are predisposed - by establishing a caring, comfortable
environment to advance adolescent amenability.
By affording adolescents legal autonomy for consent to HIV testing and
treatment and assigning responsibility to physicians for counseling about the
importance of bringing parents into the adolescent's confidence, Colorado's statute
139. See generally Ambuel & Rappaport, supra note 63 (commenting that many minors choose to
involve their parents in medical decision making); Beier et al., supra note 63 (noting that adolescents
identify parents as someone they can turn to for help); Scherer & Reppucci, supra note 103 (finding that
minors appear mindful of their parents' wishes regarding medical decisions).
140. Hartman, supra note 26, atI 15.
141. See Ambuel & Rappaport, supra note 63, at 150-51.
142. See Comm. on Pediatric AIDS and Comm. on Adolescence, supra note 10 (recommending that
desire for parental involvement should give way to providing the adolescent treatment); Kenneth R.
Ginsburg et al., Factors Affecting the Decision to Seek Health Care: The Voice of Adolescents, 100
PEDIATRICS 922 (1997) (discussing adolescents' desire to maintain privacy).
143. See supra notes 139-141 and accompanying text.
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illustrates how the balance of these interests might be struck and policy objectives
for adolescent development and parent involvement harmonized. 144  Statutory
assignment of this responsibility to physicians reveals collaboration by lawmakers
with medical practitioners in order to ensure that discussion with the adolescent
occurs to enrich physician understanding about how to best promote the
adolescent's ability to engage responsibly in the decision-making process. Striking
the balance of interests in a way that complements rather than compounds state
policy objectives also increases the likelihood for continued involvement by the
adolescent and those who care about the adolescent, which is crucial in the context
of HIV treatment. The ongoing support offered by parents, family members, and
health care providers creates incentive for adolescent compliance with continuing
care that may be burdensome and lonely. It likewise enhances adolescent
adaptability to the challenges ahead.
General assertion of state interests in vulnerability, decisional inability, and
parental involvement by courts and legislators fails to adequately override
adolescent rights to freely engage in personal medical decision making for HIV
and is largely indefensible as a justification to encroach adolescent decision-
making liberty. Such sweeping assertion without supporting evidence stands in
striking contrast to existing data related to adolescent ability and the importance of
recognizing decision-making liberty in the context of HIV. State restriction on
adolescent access to HIV testing and treatment, in effect, discourages attempts by
adolescents to engage responsibly, perhaps even causing them to disengage from
realizing their own ability. This is in contravention of parens patriae power to
promote adolescent cognitive development. Accordingly, legislative provisions
that afford legal autonomy for adolescent medical decision making promote policy
objectives of risk reduction and disease prevention, along with the beneficence
underlying parens patriae, by extending decision-making opportunity to
adolescents for meaningful participation in their own well-being.1 45  Parens
patriae, then, should be reshaped by policymakers to extend beyond narrow
confines of common knowledge to reflect realistically the norms related to
adolescent ability. The reshaping should afford adolescent decisional liberty for
HIV testing and treatment that include choices central to personal dignity and
autonomy protected by the Due Process Clause.
B. Due Process for Decision Making
While the Supreme Court has retained parens patriae for shaping laws
governing adolescents, the Court has also required that those laws comport with
144. CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-4-1405 (6) (West 2001).
145. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 238-49 (1972) (White, J., concurring) (extolling state
interests in developmental ability of minors).
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the Due Process Clause. 14 6 Substantive and procedural components comprise due
process. Substantively, the concept of liberty includes privacy in personal decision
making, which the Court has extended to health care decision making. 147 Intrinsic
to personal decision making is an opportunity to participate meaningfully in
decision making and to define one's meaning and existence without undue
interference from the state. Personal dignity and fulfillment is found therein,
whether adolescent or adult. 148 Procedurally, the state must not deprive a person of
this substantive protection for decision making, unless substantial state interests are
furthered through regulation. The appropriate inquiry when the state infringes
decision making is whether the regulation is necessary and related to state interests,
not whether decisional liberty rights are entitled to lesser protection. 149  State
regulation of personal decision making must satisfy the rudimentary requirement
for fundamental fairness, which the Court deems essential to due process of law
and to a just approach. 150 A component to due process is informed choice in
decision making among alternative courses of action that is central to personal
dignity and autonomy at the core of liberty.' 5'
According to the Supreme Court, decision-making liberty constitutes a sphere
for individual control beyond state interference under the Due Process Clause,
52
and includes a right to engage in medical decision making. 153 Decision making as
personal as medical care fulfills the promise of the federal Constitution - whose
guarantees are not exclusive to adults - that there is a realm of personal liberty that
the government may not contravene. 154 While history and tradition - like the legal
supposition that adolescents lack decision-making ability - may be a starting point
for consideration in a substantive due process inquiry, it is not the ending point.'55
146. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14 (1967). See also Emily Buss, The Missed Opportunity in Gault, 70
U. Ct-. L. REV. 39, 49 (2003) (criticizing the Court's decision in Gault to advance an argument for
greater "commitment to the due process principles of accuracy, dignity, and participation" in juvenile
delinquency proceedings).
147. Cruzan v. Dir., Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 n.7 (1990).
148. See Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 2483 (2003) (noting that liberty is an integral part of
human freedom).
149. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279-80.
150. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 263 (1984); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543
(1971).
151. Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2475. For a position advocating that information is indispensable to
the meaningful exercise of liberties for minors, see Catherine J. Ross, An Emerging Right for Mature
Minors to Receive Information, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 223, 225 (1999) (arguing that "minors possess
autonomous liberty interests that cannot be exercised meaningfully without access to information
conveying a variety of viewpoints").
152. Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2475.
153. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278 (inferring the "principle that a competent person has a constitutionally
protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment").
154. Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2475.
155. Id. at 2480.
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Decision-making liberty extends to adolescents.' 5 6 Although the Court put
forth vulnerability, decisional inability, and parental involvement as interests that
may justify government restriction on the exercise of this right by adolescents,
these state interests lack both validity and viability for adolescent medical decision
making generally and for HIV testing and treatment particularly in the absence of
supporting evidence. The relevant inquiry is whether these state interests justify
restricting adolescent decisional liberty in the context of HIV infection. This
entails an assessment of decisional liberty, state interests, and the weight assigned
each interest in this context of care. As previously discussed, baseless assertions of
vulnerability, decisional inability, and parental involvement are substantially
weakened in this context and untenable to override adolescent rights for HIV
decision making. Abstract state interests are by no means absolute to the exclusion
or subordination of the decision-making liberty of adolescents - to whom
constitutional guarantees extend.
1 57
While minority status of adolescents does merit an analysis of these interests
by lawmakers in specific contexts in order to assess the legitimacy of state
intervention, minority status alone does not justify dilution of personal decision-
making rights, particularly when state-engineered barriers to health care are
deleterious to adolescents as a high-risk group for HIV infection and demeaning to
adolescent development. A collateral consequence for state-erected barriers to care
is the stigma and secrecy associated with H1V and AIDS that inhibit not just
adolescent access to testing and treatment, but also serve only to defeat policy aims
for awareness and health care access in order to achieve risk reduction and disease
prevention. Thus, adolescent decisional rights should not be subject to lesser
constitutional protection afforded adults in a substantially equivalent setting.
State restriction on adolescent consent and confidential access to HIV testing
and treatment neither furthers nor substantiates sweeping state concerns for
vulnerability, decisional inability and parental involvement. Particularly in this
context of medical care, state restriction on decision making, either by parent
notification and consent provisions or by legislative silence that effectively
maintains the status quo of presumptive decisional inability, undermines the
beneficence of parens patriae for promoting adolescent health. It forecloses
decision-making opportunity for informed choice by adolescents contrary to their
best interests. It also undercuts the promise of parens patriae to enable
156. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 650-51 (1979).
157. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 633-35; In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1967). See also Kent v. U.S., 383
U.S. 541 (1966) (holding that a juvenile hearing must "measure up to the essentials of due process and
fair treatment").
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adolescents to assimilate into responsible and confident decision makers into and
throughout adulthood.' 5 8
Federal due process protections, as well as parallel procedural protections
afforded by state constitutions,' 59 advance the position that statutes aimed toward
achieving policy objectives related to HIV infection should include provisions that
safeguard adolescent confidentiality and consent, unless a state can make a
particularized showing that state interests in vulnerability, decisional inability, and
parental involvement justify restriction on adolescent decision-making liberty in
the context of HIV. Several safeguards, such as confidentiality provisions and
requirements that physicians document discussions with adolescents regarding the
importance for parent or guardian guidance, could be established to maximize
adolescent ability to engage responsibly and to minimize the possible harmful
effects of delayed testing and treatment. Sufficient procedural protections are
required in order to comport with the concept of fundamental fairness. 1
60
Legal autonomy for HIV decision making should be afforded to adolescents
by statute. Statutory provisions should direct physicians to promote adolescent
informed choice among alternate courses of action, as well as involvement of
parents or other trusted adults during the informed consent process. This may be
accomplished through statutory directive for providers to document discussions
with adolescent patients, along with factors to guide physicians for documenting
reasons that substantiate noninvolvement by parents. By extending procedural
safeguards in decision making to adolescents, the state acknowledges the
importance of adolescent decision-making liberty in this context of care and
extends the beneficence of its parens patriae power by engendering in adolescents
the realization of responsible decisional ability to become productive participants
in health and self-care. Health care providers, especially physicians on the
frontlines dealing with adolescents as a high-risk group, optimize this realization.
Physicians play a vital role in the AIDS epidemic and constitute the core
resource for awareness, risk reduction, and disease prevention.' 61 As a critical
source for state exercise of parens patriae, legislators should collaborate with
physicians for strategies that include curriculum development in schools for
achieving state-related objectives about AIDS. Preventive education is chief
158. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944) (stating that "[a] democratic society
rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into full maturity as
citizens, with all that implies").
159. Discussions of heightened state constitutional protection for liberty rights are found in William
J. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977);
Ken Gormley & Rhonda G. Hartman, Privacy and the States, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1279 (1992).
160. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 263 (1984); Virgin Islands ex rel. M.B., 122 F.3d 164, 168 (3d
Cir. 1997).
161. See generally Comm. on Pediatric AIDS and Comm. on Adolescence, supra note 10.
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among these objectives. A model for AIDS prevention efforts should include
physician participation in school-sponsored programs to educate about etiologies,
thereby sensitizing adolescents about risky behaviors that place them in contact
with blood-borne pathogens. 63 Because sexual activity is the primary mode of
HIV transmission among adolescents, abstinence should be stressed, 164 along with
postponing sexual behavior, safer sexual practices, and the risks and
responsibilities of engaging in sexual behavior. Education designed to reach this
target audience that includes medical expertise and experience is more likely to
effectively debunk myths regarding HIV transmission and dissipate lingering
stigma due to adolescent misconceptions about AIDS. 65 Access to health care
should constitute another key focus, and should include a range of available
resources, which is not insignificant for adolescents who are "notoriously reluctant
,,166to use health care services.
Moreover, adolescents comprise the leading demographic for Internet use.
167
Thus, providers' web pages and on-line availability for questions will prove an
effective and efficient way to educate adolescents about issues attendant to HIV
infection, along with STDs generally. Physician availability enhances adolescent
perception that physicians care about them and enriches their understanding about
the benefit of accessing providers to discuss these issues and to undergo testing and
evaluation. Not only do out-reach counseling and straightforward communication
by physicians advance policy aims of reducing exposure and risk of transmission,
they increase connectedness with adolescents, who demonstrate openness to those
they believe are genuinely concerned, honest, and knowledgeable in ways from
which adolescents may benefit. 168 Adolescent perception of connectedness with
providers generates a sense of security and self-confidence that, in turn, shapes
self-image and self-identity. 169  This is especially important to adolescent
development of skills for overcoming peer pressure and avoiding high-risk
activities.
162. See COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-4-1405(2) (West 2001). See also AIDS Action Comm. of
Mass. v. Mass. Bay Transp. Inc., 849 F.Supp. 79 (D. Mass. 1993), aff'd, 42 F.3d I (1' Cir. 1994)
(underscoring importance that minors receive information about the prevention of AIDS).
163. See COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-4-1405(2) (West 2001). See also Parents United for Better
Schools, Inc. v. School Dist. of Philadelphia Bd. of Educ., 148 F.3d 260 (3d Cir. 1998) (condoning
implementation of education related to transmission and prevention of HIV infection).
164. Stressing abstinence may, in effect, reinforce self-held belief by adolescents. See Nina
Bernstein, Behind Fall in Pregnancy: A New Teenage Culture of Restraint, N.Y. TIMES, March 7, 2004,
at Al.
165. Millstein, supra note 10, at 12-13.
166. Wilcox, supra note 25, at 67.
167. See Alan Goldstein & Vikas Bajaj, Teens Setting Tech Trends-And Firms are Paying
Attention, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 1, 2002, at Al.
168. Ginsburg et al., supra note 142, at 925-26; Ginsburg et al., supra note 56, at 1917.
169. See Beier et al., supra note 63, at 331; Ginsburg et al., supra note 142, at 929-30; Ginsburg et
al., supra note 56, at 1917-18.
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Aside from information dissemination, physicians could further parens
patriae through legislative provisions that afford adolescents privacy protection.
As studies have shown, when adolescents perceive that providers maintain and
safeguard their privacy, they are more likely to access care, seek out providers, and
demonstrate amenability to testing and treatment by those they trust. 170 Trust and
ease in testing are important in the context of HIV infection because adolescents
may internalize fear and anxiety due to social opprobrium against those infected or
simply suspected of being informed of HIV infection. Distrust and fear of
discrimination in health care decrease the likelihood that adolescents will access
testing and candidly disclose to providers risky behaviors. Avoidance in the
context of HIV is adverse to adolescent health, given the promise of combination
antiviral therapies and clinical prophylaxes that pose a potential for longer, higher
quality of life. Escalation in HIV infection among adolescents and the compelling
need to identify asymptomatic adolescents at the earliest stages of infection
advance the necessity for an activist stance by physicians in safeguarding the
privacy of adolescent patients with statutory protection.
Physicians not only recognize that protecting adolescent privacy is essential
to effectuating health policy associated with AIDS but also to promoting
adolescent overall health and well-being. This is so even when parents or
guardians confront physicians with disclosure demands for information pertaining
to the adolescent patient. 17 1 Due to their developmental stage, physicians believe
that adolescents benefit from confidentiality in ways beyond any benefit accruing
to adults.' 72  As adolescents progress toward adulthood, their desire to engage in
autonomous decision making and to have their decisions respected by others
strengthens self-conception, as studies have shown. 173 Unwanted disclosure has
proven destructive to adolescent decisional development and self-image.17 4 In the
context of HIV, it may be permeably destructive to adolescent self-perception due
to the psychosocial implications from residual stigma and discrimination
associated with AIDS. Stigma and discrimination imputed to AIDS can lead, in
some cases, to serious identity crisis that is not inconsequential to adolescents.
170. Ginsburg et al., supra note 56, at 1917-18.
171. See Hartman, supra note 26, at 112-13. In fact, physicians protect adolescent confidences in
spite of pressure or threats by parents who demand disclosure and despite the lack of statutory
safeguards. Hartman, supra note 26, at 112-13.
172. See Council on Scientific Affairs, Confidential Health Services for Adolescents, 269 JAMA
1420, 1423 (March 17, 1993). See also Ginsburg et al, supra note 142, at 929-30 (identifying benefits
such as accessing care, divulging personal information, complying with treatment, and perceiving
respect).
173. See, e.g., Maggiolini et al., supra note 103, at 419; Michael J. Dolgin et al., Caregivers'
Perceptions of Medical Compliance in Adolescents with Cancer, 7 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH CARE 22,
26(1986).
174. See generally Council on Scientific Affairs, supra note 172.
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Adolescents are among those at highest risk for suicide. 175 Thus, even in the
absence of statutory provisions that protect adolescent privacy, physicians concede
that they are willing to risk exposure to potential legal challenges by maintaining
confidentiality. 176
Protecting adolescent privacy advances the physician's role as a mentor to
assist adolescent development for responsible decision making. Mentorship for
adolescents has been shown to dramatically decrease behavior that places
adolescents at risk for HIV, especially sexual activity. 177 This underscores the
utility of mentorship by physicians in risk reduction and prevention of HIV
infection among adolescents. Research about mentorship in the lives of
adolescents reveals a composite of qualities that a mentor is someone who may be
trusted, and cares about the adolescent by showing support and respect.
178
According to researchers, the "mentor must have competence, and know
something that the youth does not know, and be able to share that knowledge.' 79
Providers, especially physicians, can mentor adolescents by being an
inspiration - perhaps even a lifeline - for access to health care and to understand
the importance for self-care. In this role, physicians may assist adolescents in
nurturing abilities for mature decision making and for thoughtful, individualized
approaches to their care, as mentorship is associated with adolescent
development.' Testing positive for HIV, moreover, entails long-term, continued
adherence to treatments that are evolving, as well as "complex, time-consuming,
and, at times, demoralizing."''8 Physicians contribute considerably to adolescent
cognitive development and decision making when the patient must confront the
prospect of continuity of care into and possibly throughout adulthood. Research
with adolescents who experience disease reveals a "role of central importance" for
doctors to cultivate adolescent self-assuredness in facing difficulties and advance
into adulthood with "an ability to adapt and to command the outside world with a
belief in their own ability to make decisions while maintaining a greater sense of
their own limitations."'
' 82
175. Comm. on Adolescence, Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Suicide and Suicide Attempts in Adolescents,
105 PEDIATRICS 871 (2000). Others at high risk are seniors. See Sharon Parmet, Suicide in Older
Persons, 291 JAMA 1158 (March 3, 2004).
176. Hartman, supra note 26, at 112-13.
177. Beier et al., supra note 63, at 330.
178. Beier et al., supra note 63, at 330.
179. Beier et al., supra note 63, at 330.
180. Beier et al., supra note 63, at 330.
181. Kimberly M. Mutcherson, No Way To Treat A Woman: Creating An Appropriate Standard for
Resolving Medical Treatment Disputes Involving HIV-Positive Children, 25 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 221,
275 (2002).
182. Maggiolini et al., supra note 103, at 419. Although physicians are uniquely situated for a
mentorship role with adolescents, increased training and education of physicians targeted to the
specialized needs of patient care, such as HIV, are warranted. See Hartman, supra note 26, at 128-29;
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Statutes requiring provider notification to parents or guardians regarding
adolescent HIV testing or treatment at once obscure the scope of privacy afforded
adolescents while marginalizing parental involvement. Although it may be
claimed that statutory protection for adolescent privacy threatens parent
participation by driving a wedge in the parent-child relationship, thereby causing
family discord, there is nothing in the ordinary course of human experience to
indicate that adolescents will not seek parental guidance with health care decision
making that has potentially serious, long-term effects. In fact, parental
involvement has been shown to increase in both extent and quality when
adolescents choose to involve their parents, to whom they will most likely turn for
support and sustenance.'
8 3
Additionally, practitioners tend to exercise discretionary judgment and
counsel adolescents as to whether parent notification would add anything to the
adolescents' best interests or instead detract from adolescent compliance with
care. 8 4 State courts have underscored the importance of safeguarding adolescent
confidentiality, as previously discussed, 85 and statutes aimed at HIV testing and
treatment typically delegate to physicians the exercise of medical judgment as to
whether parent notification and/or consent is warranted in the circumstances.'
86
While these provisions vary considerably by state, they commonly omit guidance
to physicians in making this judgment that consequently generates physician
perception of legal vulnerability.
Adult guidance during adolescent medical decision making is essential to the
emergence of mature, responsible judgment by adolescents. Adult guidance may
be better achieved when physicians encourage adolescents to involve a trusted
adult and confer with the adolescent as to achieving this. Studies suggest that,
although adolescents turn to parents for guidance in health care, they experience a
greater sense of family support and solidarity, including close collaboration with
their doctor, when physicians act as mediators between adolescents and their
parents. 87  Thus, physicians should facilitate an adolescent's medical decisional
process by offering assistance to adolescents when informing their parents (and
partners who may be at risk), thereby providing a supportive setting for disclosure.
Beier et al., supra note 63, at 331. Education and training should focus more on how physicians can
enhance development of the emerging adult within the adolescents and less on legal liability concerns,
especially when no reported case demonstrates a successful legal claim against a doctor for maintaining
adolescent confidentiality.
183. Beier et al., supra note 63, at 330-31; Ambuel & Rappaport, supra note 63, at 150-51; Scherer
& Reppucci, supra note 103, at 134-35.
184. Hartman, supra note 26, at 113, 115. See also Attorney Ad Litem for D.K. v. Parents of D.K.,
780 So.2d 301, 310 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (acknowledging that parent involvement can inhibit
minors from seeking and succeeding in treatment).
185. See supra notes 67-89 and accompanying text.
186. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-592(a) (West 2003).
187. Beier et al., supra note 63, at 329, 331.
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Statutes should direct - and protect - physicians in facilitating adolescent
decision-making processes. This could strengthen adolescent trust in physicians,
especially when studies indicate that doctors are not the persons most preferred by
adolescents for consult in time of crisis.188 For example, Colorado squarely states
that parent or guardian consent shall not be a prerequisite to the examination and
treatment of minors for HIV infection. 189 Connecticut requires the consent of a
parent or guardian, unless the physician determines and documents reasons why
notification would result in a denial of treatment or the physician adjudges it
unlikely that the adolescent will continue treatment and the adolescent requests
that a parent or guardian not be notified.' 90 Other states such as Delaware,
Michigan, New Mexico, and Ohio declare that a minor's consent is valid and
binding without any parent involvement.' 9 '
In the absence of statutory directive, physicians should maintain adolescent
confidentiality rather than insist on parent involvement. While physicians may
facilitate parent involvement, their principal obligation is to ensure adolescent
access to care. In this respect, physicians perform a gate-keeping function by
coordinating multidisciplinary support, including links to mental health providers
and social services, and securing trust by adolescents that intimate communications
will be regarded seriously and respectfully. Physicians contribute to adolescent
cognitive development by engaging adolescents in ways that are responsive to their
concerns and choices during the decision-making process. As has been the case in
other areas of patient care such as end-of-life decision making and advance health
care planning, physician practices have influenced and informed statutory law. 1
92
Thus, legislators should partner with physicians to shape health policy
specifically related to adolescent patient care and to construct a statutory
framework that is informed by clinical practice. Partnership between policymakers
and health care practitioners should focus on HIV testing and treatment, due not
only to policy objectives for risk reduction and disease prevention but principally
to the unprecedented rise in HIV infection among adolescents. Expertise and
experience with adolescents enable physicians to be powerful policy advocates for
informing lawmakers about precise problems and practices in adolescent patient
care, along with multidisciplinary resources that should be available to adolescents.
Physicians may advance policy objectives by corresponding with legislators about
issues in adolescent patient care, by testifying before legislative subcommittees,
188. Beier et al., supra note 63, at 329, 331.
189. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-4-1405(6) (West 2001).
190. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-592(a) (West 2003).
191. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1202(f) (2003); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.5127(l) (West
2001); N.M. STAT. ANN. 24-2B-3 (Michie 2000); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.242B (Anderson 2002
& Supp. 2003).
192. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-592 (West 2003); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.5127(2)
(West 2001); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-148(h) (2003).
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and by lobbying legislators to devote attention to issues in need of policy
development for adolescent medical decision making, including issues in HIV
testing and treatment related to this high-risk group.
CONCLUSION
Issues in law and policy take on new urgency as the AIDS epidemic
experiences a shift in the rising number of HIV-infected adolescents. State statutes
that further a policy agenda for HIV risk reduction and AIDS prevention do not
focus on adolescents as a high-risk group. Health policy for promoting HIV
testing and treatment for adolescents is virtually nonexistent. In fact, the national
AIDS research portfolio does not adequately reflect treatment of adolescent AIDS
or the unique questions requiring investigation. Nor has it singled out adolescents
to enable states to develop health policy agenda on behalf of youth. This
inattention undermines parens patriae-based policy objectives, reflected through
deficiencies in current statutory law aimed toward HIV prevention that neither
address nor afford adequate protection for adolescent decision-making liberty. The
unprecedented rise of HIV infection among adolescents affords lawmakers an
opportunity to develop a model framework for analyzing adolescent decisional
rights and state interests that, when applied to HIV infection, advances the need for
adolescent legal decision-making autonomy.
The Supreme Court has identified peculiar vulnerability, decisional
inability, and parental involvement as legitimate interests of the state for restricting
the decisional autonomy of minors, despite extension of liberty guaranteed by the
Due Process Clause to adolescents for freedom to engage in personal decision
making. The focus should be whether these state interests for overriding
adolescent decisional rights in the context of HIV can be legitimized. Absent
overriding state interests, reliance by courts and legislatures on these interests
results in an impermissible denial of decision-making liberty in the context of HIV
infection that disrupts not only adolescent development for responsible judgment
and self-reliance, but contravenes policy objectives for risk reduction and disease
prevention. These interests, either individually or collectively, are not supported
by existing evidence. Reliance on these interests, therefore, is insufficient to
override the exercise of adolescent decisional rights for HIV testing and treatment.
Thus, state restriction arguably lacks justification to differentiate adolescents for
exercising decision-making liberty for HIV, which should not be within
dispensation of adults alone.
Decisional rights in this context suggest that statutory protection for, rather
than restriction of, adolescent decision making would actually promote state
interests for HIV risk reduction and prevention. It would also enhance state parens
patriae power by promoting the health and well-being of adolescents. Parens
patriae, as an elastic and evolving basis for state regulation of minors' rights,
should be reshaped by legislators to recognize adolescent decision-making liberty
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as part of the AIDS agenda, rather than to its exclusion. By reflecting changing
cultural and legal norms, statutes that now afford decisional autonomy to
adolescents for mental health, substance abuse, and STD treatment advance this
position. However, piecemeal progression of adolescent legal autonomy is
inadequate, given the liberty rights at stake.
There is a paucity of definitive statutory law regarding HIV testing and
treatment of adolescents. Beneficence associated with parens patriae is furthered
through statutes that acknowledge adolescent decisional liberty for HIV, while
fostering development for decision-making ability. Notwithstanding limited
statutory grants of decision-making protection, a comprehensive statutory scheme
is needed to afford adolescents the dignity found in personal decision making
guaranteed by the Due Process Clause that should be proactive, rather than
reactive, to issues concerning adolescents in the AIDS epidemic. Health care
practitioners, especially physicians, contribute considerably to achieving this end
by partnering with policymakers to ensure statutes that afford legal autonomy to
adolescents for HIV infection are informed by clinical practice. These statutes are
long overdue, as researchers over a decade ago foresaw the "overwhelming"
numbers of HIV-infected adolescents due to legislative oversight.' 93 The time is
now for lawmakers to collaborate with physicians to develop sound policy and
practice standards responsive to adolescent needs.194  Concerted efforts by
legislators and practitioners in furthering cogent policy goals for decision-making
responsibility by adolescents about HIV are essential to facilitating "informed,
voluntary, and confidential use of tests designed to detect HIV infection",195 to
achieving AIDS reduction and prevention for this group most at risk, and
ultimately to improving the lives of adolescents.
193. See generally Wilcox, supra note 25, at 69 (foreseeing that "the nation seems incapable of
recognizing the gravity of the threat posed by adolescent AIDS and HIV infection until the number of
victims becomes overwhelming...").
194. See Robert Steinbrook & Jeffrey M. Drazen, Editorial, AIDS - Will the Next 20 Years be
Different?, 344 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1781, 1782 (June 7, 2001) (averring that "[t]reating and preventing
infection must be viewed in terms of simple morality and humanity, not as an endeavor that is burdened
by national and sexual politics, misinformation, stigma, and blame").
195. See Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 214.181(1) (Banks-Baldwin 1992 & Supp. 2003).
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